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I. INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") in 1977 to
address the problem of corruption in international business transactions. The Act
criminalizes payments to foreign government officials intended to influence the
official or to obtain an improper advantage. However, the legislation ambiguously
defines prohibited conduct and its provisions lack an adequate standard by which
to determine the nature of contemplated activity. While the FCPA is a noble
attempt at tackling a serious transnational problem, its flaws are subjects of
continued criticism. One faction ofcommentators defends the Act unconditionally
due to a foreseen importance in eliminating bribery in business transactions at any
expense. An opposing camp considers the FCPA to be poorly drafted legislation
and question the Act's utility in actually curbing corruption. These commentators
argue that the Act puts American businesses at a competitive disadvantage in
international business. While both sides present valid arguments, an intermediate
position may represent the most viable solution. Amending the FCPA to reduce
ambiguities will establish a more effective policy, by reducing unnecessary costs
and promoting ethical behavior.
The policy behind the FCPA is one of substantial importance and thus the
probability of the statute's repeal in the near future is low. While corruption is
detrimental to international business, measures to eliminate such should be as
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efficient as possible, in order to ensure the costs of compliance are not as
burdensome as the corruption it seeks to eliminate. Although most recognize the
harmful effects of corruption on the global economy, the difficulty lies in
defining what constitutes corrupt activity. Ambiguities inherent in the Act make
it difficult to determine what activity is prohibited. Further, on an international
scale, the definition of bribery varies from one culture to the next. Business
practices in one context, such as in the United States, are not necessarily
transferable to another. Consequently, to become a more effective tool in
reducing corruption, the Act should be clarified by addressing problems in
defining prohibited activities and the lack of guidelines to assist compliance.
Unnecessary costs are imposed on American companies conducting business
abroad due to uncertainties in complying with the Act's provisions. Additional
costs result from uncertainty among businesses as to whether potential conduct
may be a violation. Uncertainties deter businesses from engaging in foreign
transactions and encourage overly cautious behavior. Clarifying ambiguities in
the FCPA could reduce costs to American businesses by minimizing uncertainty
in conducting business activity overseas. Greater certainty would strengthen the
Act's objectives in eliminating corruption by promoting a policy that more
effectively balances the costs and benefits of compliance.
II. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT

The enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act emerged during the
turbulent post-Watergate era.' After the discovery of illegal domestic political
contributions, investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") uncovered numerous payments made by American corporations to
foreign government officials in return for favorable treatment.' While the

payments themselves were not illegal, the SEC began prosecuting for failures to

3
report these payments under the disclosure provisions of federal securities law.
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service prosecuted companies for illegally
deducting improper payments to foreign government officials.4 Concerned that
these activities were undermining the integrity of American businesses at home
and abroad,' Congress responded by enacting the FCPA.6

Copyright 2001, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
I. George C. Greanias & Duane Windsor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 17 (1982)
[hereinafter Greanias & Windsor]; see also Don Zarin, Doing Business Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act 1-1 (1995) [hereinafter Zarin]; Stephen F. Black& Roger M. Witten, Complyingwith the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 1.01, in I Business Law Monographs, International Series (2000)
[hereinafter Black & Witten].
2. Greanias& Windsor, supra note 1, at 17-31; Zarin, supra note 1, at 1-i.
3. Black & Witten, supra note 1, at I-I.
4.
Id.
5. Congressman Henry A. Waxman stated, "(riecent disclosure of illegal and questionable
payments by U.S. corporations raise grave issues of national policy, and if they are uncorrected, this
conduct threatens the public confidence in the management of public-owned corporations, in the
economic system and in the integrity of the political process." House Committee on Interstate and
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The Act contains provisions governing both corporate accounting regulations
and anti-bribery restrictions.7 The accounting provisions are a part of an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and are enforced by the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").' Corporations, which have issued
a class ofsecurities requiring registration or which are required to file reports under
the 1934 Act (hereinafter referred to as "issuers"), are obligated to comply with the
accounting provisions of the FCPA.9 The accounting provisions are intended to
serve as a deterrent to illegal business practices, such as creating off-the-books
"slush funds," misrepresenting the nature of commercial transactions, and
falsifying the identify of a payment's recipient. 0 The provision requires the issuer
to keep books, records, and accounts in reasonable detail reflecting the
corporation's transactions, including any dispositions ofthe corporation's assets.I
Additionally, issuers are required to create and "maintain a system of internal
accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that" transactions
receive proper authorization, "transactions are recorded as necessary," access to
corporate assets is limited, and accountability exists for differences between
recorded and actual assets.'"
The accounting provisions impose liability on individuals who "knowingly
circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system ofinternal accounting controls
or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account... ."" The terms "reasonable
assurances" and "reasonable detail" are defined by the prudent man standard,
which entails a "level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent
officials in the conduct oftheir own affairs."' 4 Penalties for false and misleading
statements under the accounting provisions include fines not more than $1,000,000
and/or imprisonment for not more than 10 years for violations by individuals and
a fine not exceeding $2,500,000 for business entities.' 5 In addition, a failure to file

Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Regulatory Reform, Volume V:
Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Communications Commissions, Securities and Exchange
Commission, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 496 (May 20, 21,24 and June 1, 1976).
6. Pamela J. Jadwin & Monica Shilling, Note, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 31 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 677, 677-78 (1994) [hereinafter Jadwin & Shilling].
7. Ambiguities within the accounting provisions will not be addressed within this paper.
8. See Jeffrey P. Bialos & Gregory Husisian, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Coping With
Corruption In Transitional Economies 61-71 (1997) [hereinafter Bialos & Husisian]; Black & Witten,
supra note 1, at 6-1 to 6-14.
9. The accountingprovisions apply to "[e]very issuer which has a class of securities registered
pursuant to section 782 ofthis title [or] ... which is required to file reports pursuant to section 78o(d)
of this title" 15 U.S.C. § 78m(bX2)(1994). "[§ 781]generally requires that, for any security to trade
on a national securities exchange, there must be a registration statement in effect. [§ 78o(d)] generally
requires issuers of securities registered in accord with [§ 781] to file periodic reports and other
information with the SEC." Black & Witten, supra note I, at 6-3.
10. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 62.
11.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2XA) (1994).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(BXi-iv) (1994).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(bX5) (1994).
14. Jadwin & Schilling, supra note 6, at 680 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (1994)).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1994).
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will result in a fine of$100 a day for as long as
information, documents, or reports
16
the failure to file continues.
The Act's anti-bribery provisions criminalize any payments that are
"corruptly" made to foreign officials.17 The anti-bribery provisions apply to
9
issuers," domestic concerns (which include American citizens and companies
2°
formed under United States law), and any person acting within the United States.
The Act prohibits offering, giving, or authorizing the payment of anything of value

to a foreign official, 2' foreign political party, or candidate for foreign political
office, for the purpose influencing any act or decision ofsuch foreign official in his
official capacity, inducing the official to do or not do any act in violation of his
lawful duty, securing an improper advantage, or inducing such official to use his
influence to affect any act or decision of the government in order to obtain, retain,

or direct business.22 Furthermore, bribery offoreign officials indirectly or through
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(b) (1994).
17. The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA contain three separate sections, each defining a
different class ofpersons that may be subject to the Act's regulations; § 78dd -1 applies to any issuer
that "has a class of securitiesregistered pursuant to section 781 of this title or which is required to file
reports under section 78o(d) of this title" or any officer, director, employee, or agent acting on its
behalf; § 78dd-2applies to domestic concerns and any officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder
of the domestic concern, acting on its behalf; § 78dd-3 applies to any person (other than issuers or
domestic concerns) or any officer, director, employee, agent or stockholder acting on behalf ofsuch
person, "while in the territory of the UnitedStates." 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I to dd-3 (Supp. V. 1999)
(emphasis added).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I(a) (Supp. V. 1999); see text accompanying supra note 9.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(hXl) (1994) defines "domestic concern" as:
(A) any individual who is acitizen, national, or resident of the United States; and
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its principal place of
business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a State of the
United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (Supp. V. 1999).
21. "The term 'foreign official' means any officer or employee of aforeign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or ofapublic international organization, or any person
acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or
instrumentality, or for Or on behalf ofany such public international organization." 15 U.S.C. § 78ddl(f)(l)(A) (Supp. V. 1999).
22. For purposes of(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, (ii)
inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation ofthe lawful duty
ofsuch official, or (iii)securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any actor decision of such government
or instrumentality,in orderto assistsuch [issuer/domestic concern/person] in obtaining
or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person;
(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign
political office for purposes of(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or candidate in its or his
official capacity, (ii)inducing such party, official, or candidate to do or omit to do an
act in violation of the lawful duty ofsuch party, official, or candidate, or (iii) securing
improper advantage; or
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third parties is also prohibited. ' Violations of the anti-bribery provisions may result
in a fine up to $2,000,000 for a business entity and a fine ofnot more than$100,000,
or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both for individuals.' Both
individuals and business entities may be subject to a maximum of $10,000 civil
penalty for violations. '
I. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Extraterritoriality
The activity that the FCPA aims to regulate is the giving of a payment or gift to
an individual with governmental authority in a foreign country in order to influence
that person to use his or her position to grant an advantage to the payee. This activity
is commonly known as a "bribe." In the United States, bribery not only constitutes
an illegal act, but it also carries a social stigma and is generally considered to be an
immoral activity.' Under the domestic bribery laws of the United States, both the
offering of a payment to a government official and the acceptance of the payment by
the official are prohibited." By contrast, however, the FCPA criminalizes only the
improper payment to the official and does not impose liability on the recipient of such

(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his influence with a foreign
governmentor instrumentality thereofto affect or influence any act or decision ofsuch
governmentor instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer [domestic concern/person]
in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person; or
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion ofsuch money or thing of value
will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official,
to any foreign political party or official thereof, orto any candidate for foreign
political office, for purposes of(A) (i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official, political party, party
official, or candidate in his or its official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official,
political party, party official, orcandidate to do or omit to do any act in violation of
the lawful duty ofsuch foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate, or
(iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official, political party, party official, or candidate to use his or
its influence with a foreign governmentor instrumentality thereofto affect or influence
any act ordecision of'such government or instrumentality, in order to assist such issuer
[domestic concem/person] in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, any person.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(aXl), (2Xa)(l), (3)(aX1) (1994 &Supp. V. 1999).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(lXaX3)(Supp. V. 1999); §78dd (2)(aX3) (Supp. V. 1999); § 78dd (3)(a)(3)
(Supp. V. 1999); see alsoJadwin &Shilling, supra note 6, at 681.
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2Xg), §78dd-3(e) (Supp. V. 1999).
25. Id.
26. "The payments of bribes to influence the acts or decisions of foreign officials, foreign
political parties, or candidates for foreign political office is unethical. It is counter to the moral
expectations and values of the American public."ProhibitingBribes to Foreign Officials: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee onBanking,Housing,and UrbanAffairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976)

(statement by Senator Proxmire) (quoted in Bialos &Husisian, supra note 8, at 144).
27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.§ §201-19 (1994 &Supp. 1999); La. R.S. 14:118(1986 &Supp. 2001).
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a payment. 2s Bribery in a tansnational context encompasses numerous additional
factors, not otherwise present in domestic cases, causing the regulation of bribery
beyond territorial limits to become a far more difficult task. Countries hold differing
perspectives as to what conduct should be prohibited and thus, an individual may be
subject to conflicting standards of conduct. For example, an overlap may occur when
one state prohibits its citizens from engaging in a particular activity while its citizens are
physically located within the territorial boundaries of another counlry and the host
country does not prohibit such activity.
Under international law, traditional theories of prescriptive jurisdiction29 over
extraterritorial activities provide a basis for a state to regulate conduct that occurs
outside of its territorial limits." Accordingly, a state can enact laws governing both
conduct that occurs within its territory and the conduct of its nationals anywhere inthe
world." When an activity is prohibited extraterritorially, the potential for conflicting
regulation exists. Indeed, a citizen of the prohibiting country traveling abroad may be
constrained from engaging in a certain activity while every other individual within the
foreign territory isfree to engage in the same conduct.
The assertion ofjurisdiction over conduct occurring within another state's territory
isan unfavorable practice, oftenregarded as intruding on the sovereignty ofthe foreign
state." When Congressional directives are notexplicit, courts interpret legislation as not
extending extraterritorially when such an extension of jurisdiction would be
3
unreasonable in light of a foreign state's interests. Prior to the enactment of the
28. SeeClaycoPetroleumCorp.v. Occidental PetroleumCorp.,712 F.2d404,406(9thCir. 1983)
(holding that the FCPA does not abrogate the act of state doctrine in private suits based on foreign
payments and citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250,252,18 S.Ct. 83, 84 (1897), which first
annunciated the act of state doctrine: "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory.").
29. "The term jurisdiction may be defined as the authority to effect legal interests-to prescribe
rules oflaw (legislative orprescriptivejurisdiction), to adjudicate legal questions (judicial jurisdiction),
and to compel or induce compliance (enforeementjurisdiction)." Christopher L.Blakesley, Terrorism,
Drugs, International Law, and the Protection ofHuman Liberty 94 (1992).
30. The "five traditional bases of jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime": (I) territorialjurisdiction over conductwhere an element or the effect ofthe crime occurs within the state's territory;
(2) nationality-jurisdiction based on the nationality of the perpetrator, no matter where the activity
occurs; (3)protective-jurisdictionoverconductthat "threatens [a] state's sovereignty, security, or some
important government function;" (4) passive personality-jurisdiction on the basis of the victim's
nationality; (5)universal-jurisdiction overacts that are universally condemned "when no other state has
a prior interest in asserting jurisdiction." Id. at 96-97.
31. See text accompanying supra note 30.
32. The committee commented that such an extension ofjurisdiction extraterritorially "demeans
the enforcement responsibility of the foreign State for such conduct, discredits the applicable foreign
law and deprives the foreign States of the often critical determination as to whether, in the light of
relevant legal and political considerations, to initiate prosecution for a particutar offense." H. Lowell
Brown, The ExtraterritorialReachofthe US. Government's CampaignAgainst InternationalBribery,
22 Hastings Int'l &Comp. L. Rev. 407, 437 (1999) [hereinafter Brown l](citing Ad Hoc Committee
on Foreign Payments of the Association of theBar of the City of New York, Report on Questionable
Foreign Payments by Corporations: The Problem and Approaches to a Solution (1977)).
33. "Legislatures and administrative agencies, in the United States and in other states, have
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FCPA, the United States limited its assertion of jurisdiction over conduct
occurring within the jurisdiction ofanother state to situations where "significant
'
policy concerns outweighed the interests of the foreign state." 34
Some have
argued that the extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the FCPA may
constitute overreaching or "moral imperialism" by the United States." However,
others assert that the destructive effect of transnational bribery justifies the
extraterritorial regulation of the activity.36
B. DualPolicy Concerns:Effects ofCorruption Versus Competitive
Disadvantage
Concerns regarding the negative impact of bribery on international
commerce have been a powerful motivation in support of the FCPA since its
enactment. Bribery and corruption, in general, have detrimental effects on the
economic interests ofeveryone involved." For the firm paying a bribe, the costs
of doing business increase.3" The consequences of corruption in a developing
country are even more pronounced, effecting the country's economy and
government in a variety of ways.39 For example, corruption may result in a
misallocation of resources, such as shifting scarce resources away from public
works projects.' Moreover, corruption discourages foreign investment by
increasing the costs associated with doing business in a country. 4 Corruption
may also inflate the costs ofgoods.42 Further, bribery threatens political stability
43 and market institutions' by threatening legitimacy and public confidence in
these institutions. The whole international community is affected by corruption
through economic inefficiency and inflated transaction costs in international

generally refrained from exercising jurisdiction where it would be unreasonable to do so, and courts
have usually interpreted general language in a statute as not intended to exercise or authorize the
exercise ofjurisdiction in circumstances where application of the statute would be unreasonable." Id.
at 438-39 n.112 (citing Restatement (Third) ofForeign Relations § 403 cmt. a (1986)).
34.
35.

Id. at 437; seesupra note 32.
See Steven R. Salbu,Briberyin the GlobalMarket:A CriticalAnalysis oftheForeign Corrupt

Practices Act, 54 Wash. &Lee L. Rev. 229, 275-76 (1997) [hereinafter Salbu I].
36.

Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and

Fragmentation, 24 Yale J.Int'l L. 257, 298 (1999) [hereinafter Nichols].
37.

Melissa K. Hurst, Comment, EliminatingBribery in InternationalTransactions, 6 J.Int'l L.

& Prac. 111, 114-17 (1997) [hereinafter Hurst].
38. Id. at 116.
39. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8,at 3-4.
40. Hurst, supra note 37, at 115-16 (pointing out that the payment ofbribes to public officials in
public works projects reduces the amount of money allocated to the project that may result in cost
cutting and shoddy construction).
41. Id. at 116.
42. Mark J. Murphy, Comment, International Bribery: An Example of an Unfair Trade
Practice?, 21 Brook. J. Int'l L. 385, 391 (1995).
43. Id.
44. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 146.
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trade and investment.45 Hence, the United States has a direct interest in the
elimination of transnational bribery.
With such policy considerations in mind, the United States has taken positive steps
to eliminate corruptbusiness practices internationally by forbidding such conduct even
ifitmust do sounilaterally. While almost every country prohibits the bribery of its own
officials, the United States is the only country to extend its legislative jurisdiction
beyond territorial boundaries to criminalize the bribery of foreign officials.' An
ongoing debate raises questions as to whether such a prohibition comes at the expense
47
of American business by putting them at a competitive disadvantage. The FCPA
subjects only American nationals and businesses to liability for prohibited activities
committed abroad," while similar activities by foreign competitors remain unrestricted.
Some argue the inequity creates an advantage for foreign companies competing with
American businesses for the same government contracts, while not subject to the same
49

regulation.
The competitive disadvantage argument takes the position that bribery is a reality
in many countriese and thatprolubitions against payments by United States companies
abroad cause harm to American businesses.5' Commentators suggest that United States
companies are extremely disadvantaged when competing against foreign companies that
45. "'[W]hereas an occasional act of corruption may be efficient, corruption once systematized
and deeply ingrained never is.' While it may seem initiallyinnocuous to allow bribes to expedite faster
bureaucratic performance-a kind of"tip" for speedy service-allowing such payments inevitably leads
to an incentive for monopolistic officials intentionally to slow their efforts to encourage these tips."
Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 146-48.
46. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 27; Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign
CorruptPractices Act To Include A PrivateRight Of Action, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 185, 186 (1994)
[hereinafter Pines].
47. For arguments against the competitive disadvantage theory, see Pines, supranote 46, at 20716 (arguing the economic harm argument is unpersuasive); Mary Jane Sheffet, The ForeignCorrupt
PracticesAct andthe Omibus Tradeand Competitiveness Act of 1988: Did They Change Corporate
Behavior?, 14 J. Pub. Pol'y & Mktg. 290,297 (1995) (concludingfrom a surveythat compliance costs
have notmade it impossible for U.S. corporations to compete abroad); Michael A. Almond & Scott D.
Syfert, Beyond Compliance:Corruption,CorporateResponsibility,andEthicalStandardsin the New
Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. Int'l. & Com. Reg. 389, 396 (1997) (arguing there is no compelling
evidence that the FCPA puts American firms at a competitive disadvantage to European or Asian
counterparts).
48. Liability may also include foreign agents and subsidiaries of American individuals and
businesses.
49. "The contrast between the FCPA's strict prohibition of overseas bribes and the absence of
similar legislationthroughoutthe rest of the world creates alopsided playing field." Salbu l,supranote
35, at 255.
50. "A World Bank survey of 3,600 firms in sixty-nine nations revealed that forty percent of
businesses are payingbribes. Fifteen percent of businesses in industrial countries pay bribes while the
percentage in the former Soviet Union is a staggering sixty percent." J. Lee Johnson, Comment,A
GlobalEconomy andthe ForeignCorruptPracticesAct: Some Facts Worth Knowing,63 Mo. L. Rev.
979, 979 (1998); Salbu I, supranote 35, at 232 ("Corruption is a tenacious reality in many global
markets, where foreign officials continue to solicit bribes routinely from U.S. companies and their
representatives").
51. Salbu I, supranote35,at 261; Amy Borrus et al.,A WorldofGreasedPalms,InsidetheDirty
WarFor GlobalBusiness, Bus. Wk., Nov. 6, 1995, at 36 [hereinafter Bonus].
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pay bribes for international capital projects. 2 Due to the unilateral nature of the
restriction, U.S. firms may be handicapped or even precluded from competing.53 While
many interpretations of trade data and opinion surveys of American executives
conducted over the years offer conflicting indications as to whether U.S. business are
in fact at a competitive disadvantage, recent goverrunent reports suggest there may
indeed be some truth to the speculations oflost business. ' In a study conducted by the
Commerce Departnent, tracking 100 deals worth $45 billion in which foreign
companies used bribes to undercut American companies, foreign companies were
awarded eighty percent of the contracts.5 A report given by Secretary of Commerce
Ron Brown before the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee,
estimated that in 200 overseas competitions during an eight year period, American
companies lost about half of the contracts, resulting in a loss of $25 billion, due to

improper involvement by foreign governments.'
While many still debate whether the FCPA really undermines the competitiveness
of American businesses abroad, the competitive disadvantage argument has been
partially incorporated into public policy.- This changing policy interest is illustrated
by the numerous amendments to the Act.58 The inclusion of exceptions for activities
52.

Salbu 1,supra note 35, at 261.

53.

Id. at 255-56.

54. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report to the Congress: Impact of Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act on U.S. Business 59 (1981)(cited in Pines, supranote 46, at 208-09) (reporting a survey
of 250 of the top 1000 corporations in the U.S. on the effects of the FCPA, where 30% claimed a
decrease in business, but 67% reported little or no decrease in business). Ina poll conducted by Louis
Harris 78% of respondents reported difficulties in conducting business in places where bribery is
common. Pines,supranote46,at208. ButseeOn the Take, Economist,Nov. 19,1988,at2l (reporting
a study byJohn Graham and Mark McKean comparing the share ofexports in corrupt countries against
non-corrupt countries and finding the U.S. market share to have increased at a roughly equivalent
percentage, from which they infer that there has been no loss in business because of the FCPA);
Christopher L. Hall, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive Disadvantage, ButForHow

Long?, 2 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 289, 304-07 (1994) [hereinafter Hall] (commenting on the Graham
and McKean study and asserting, "The subjective nature ofthe data illustrates the principle problem
in determining the FCPA's effects on United States sales abroad"); Kate Gillespie, Middle East
Response to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Cal. Mgmt. Rev., Summer 1987, at 9(asserting
from the results ofa survey that the potential of the FCPA to harm U.S. exports is unproven).
55. Borrus, supra note 51, at 36; Salbu 1,supra note 35, at 256.
56. Promoting U.S. Exports, Before the Senate Banking, Housing,and Urban Affairs Committee
(Oct. 12, 1995) (statement ofRonald H. Brown, Secretary ofCommerce); Salbu 1,supra note 35, at 256
(citing Hearing of the House Int l Comm., Int'I Econ. Policy and Trade Subcomm., on U.S. Export

Promotion Program, 104th Cong. (Oct 12, 1995) (testimony of Sec. of Commerce Ron Brown)..
57. See Robert S. Levy, Note, The Antibribery Provisions ofthe Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977: Are They Really As Valuable As We Think They Are?, 10 Del. J. Corp. L. 71, 82 (1985):

Although the FCPA has succeeded in preventingbribery by U.S. agents in foreign countries,
it has also resulted in the loss of a substantial amount of business. This is contrary to the
intended purpose of the Act. As a result of this decline in overseas business, several
senators have proposed amendments to the FCPA. Their goal is not to eliminate the
provisions of the Act, but to restructure them to maintain the decreased level of bribery
overseas and, at the same time, to remove the obstacles faced by U.S. corporations doing
business in foreign countries.
58. For example, two affirmative defenses were added in 1988 to allow an individual or company

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vo. 61

that are legal in the host country or considered to be a routine governmental activity
represents Congress's attempts to avoid overly restrictive measures against American
businesses. These considerations illustrate a changing public policy that strives for an
elimination of the bribery of foreign officials, but not at any cost. The elimination of
corruption and the advancement of American business are both material policy
considerations. Therefore, the United States must strike a balance between eliminating
bnbery, whether the motivation is because bribery is viewed as immoral or because of
its effect on international commerce, and ensuring that the regulation does not
unreasonably harm American business in the process.
One study concluded that the FCPA has primarily shifted business from American
companies to foreign competitors willing to pay bribes rather than decreasing bribery
overall. 59 Many assert that bribery remains a widespread practice in some areas.'
Recognizing the potential disadvantage to American businesses under a unilateral
prohibition, the United States now actively promotes a multilateral solution to
eliminating bribery of government officials. 6 Many commentators contend that the
competitive disadvantage results from the lack ofprohibitions or enforcement by foreign
countries oftransnational bribery.62 The United States has actively campaigned for the
creation of multilateral legislation, modeled after the FCPA, aimed at "leveling the
global playing field" in international competition.' In the beginning, many countries
rejected the idea of a FCPA styled legislation.' However, changing international
attitudes have resulted in increasing international condemnation of corruption and a
65
Indeed, the efforts of several
greater receptivity to multilateral approaches.
international organizations to promote the adoption of a multilateral agreement have
found increasing support over the years.' While amultilateral agreement may facilitate
to be immune from liability under certain circumstances. One is a defense for payments that are legal
under the foreign country's law. The other is a defense for expenditures that are related to
demonstrating products and services. See discussion at infra Part IV.A.2.
59. James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: ForeignBribery andAmerican Business After 1977,
Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 5266, at I(1995)(cited in Bialos &Husisian, supranote
8, at 139-40).
60. "[T]he incidence of transnational bribery has increased greatly over the last few decades."
Nichols, supra note 36, at 272.
61. "In July 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopherannouncedthat the United States would
renew its efforts to negotiate an international agreement banning the use of bribery in international
business dealings. This announcement was in direct response to complaints by American companies
that they were losing business in Asia due to the FCPA." Hall, supra note 54, at 309.
62. Murphy, supra note 42 (arguing many countries have a double standard, distinguishing
domestic and international bribery, which "creates a barrier that inhibits free trade by granting certain
states an advantage over others").
63. Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 Law &Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 47, 57-59 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu ll].
64. Id. at 59.
65. Id. at 59-60; see also Barbara C. George et.al., Onthe Threshold of the Adoption of Global
AntibriberyLegislation: ACriticalAnalysis ofCurrent Domestic and International Efforts Towardthe
Reduction ofBusiness Corruption, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1, 17-28 (1999) (suggesting certain factors
have caused the changes in international attitudes towards business corruption).
66. For a description of multilateral efforts by international organizations, see generally Salbu
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a resolution of the disparities between American and foreign companies, the vague
in defining prohibited conduct have not commanded broad
standards of the FCPA
67
international support.
IV. AMBIGUITIES

Ambiguities in the FCPA create vast uncertainty, even for companies attempting
to comply with the statute's provisions. Important ambiguities inthe FCPA concern the
precise conduct that the statute prohibits. When prohibited conduct is not clearly
defined, unnecessary costs may result from having to determine whether a transaction
constitutes a violation; indeed, ultimately the company may simply have toexpose itself
to the risk of sanctions in the absence of a clear answer. These uncertainties call into
question the effectiveness of the Act as a remedy in eliminating bribery. Deterrence is
weakened when the costs of attaining policy goals are perceived as unreasonable in
comparison. Critical ambiguities in the FCPA involve the vague definitions of
prohibited conduct, absence of a standard by which to judge potential activity, and
difficulties in applying concepts cross-culturally. 5
A. Vague Definitions ofProhibited Conduct
1. Intent andKnowledge Requirements
The FCPA holds not only individuals liable for violations, but also holds
companies liable for payments made by officers, directors, employees, oragents acting
on behalf of the company. 9 Hence, when an individual carries out an illegal payment
as an employee or an agent of a business entity, the entity that the individual
represents may be concurrently liable.7 The entity will be liable if it directly

II,supra note 63, at 47; Brown, supra note 34, at 407; Hurst, supra note 37, at 111.
67. See generally Stephen C. Muffler, Proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of International
Corrupt Payments: Cloning the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Is Not the Answer, I ILSA J. Int'l &

Comp. L. 3 (1995).
68. However, some commentators suggest vagueness in the Act's provisions result in part from
the limited number of cases brought before courts, restricting the courts ability to define ambiguous
provisions. Pines, supra note 46, at 196-97 (also noting the small number of cases that are brought
before courts usually involve blatant violations, further limiting the court's opportunity to establish
precedent regarding ambiguities); Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is to Be Done
With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act?, 20 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 431, 494 (1987) (asserting that

almost every enforcement proceeding is settled by plea agreements, preventing adjudication of issues
and interpretation ofprovisions) [hereinafter Longobardi].
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a) (1998 &Supp. 2000).
70. Business entity is used to describe "any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock
company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship" covered under the
definition of domestic concern. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(hX1)(B) (1998). For convenience, hereafter the
use of "company" will imply any business entity described above.
71. Although criminally liable, the domestic concern that isnot anatural person (corporation or
business entity) will only be subject to fines. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1), 78dd-3(eXl) (Supp. 2000).
This is consistent with the notion in criminal law that only fines are imposed for vicarious liability. See
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instructed the individual to commit the unlawful activity. However, the company
may be liable for an illegal activity of its employees, regardless of the company's
intent to participate, if the employees are considered to be the company's agents.
The FCPA criminalizes payments "corruptly" made to foreign officials.72
However, "corruptly" is not defined by the Act. Legislative reports characterize
"corruptly" as "an intent 'to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in
order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client and connotes an evil
motive or purpose."' Accordingly, a payment is made "corruptly" if the payor
specifically intends to influence the official in the performance of an official act. 4
Implicit in this standard is a quidproquo or the intent to give something ofvalue in
return for an official act."
In addition, the FCPA contains an additional ambiguous intent requirement
regarding the level of knowledge required to impose liability for the acts of others.
Originally, the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions concerning payments made to third
parties contained a knowledge requirement fashioned as a "reason to know
standard."76 In 1988, Congress amended the knowledge component" of the antibribery provisions to make a person liable when he knows that the money given to a
third party will be used for a purpose that is considered a violation ofthe Act." The
new requirement divides the knowledge standard into three categories: (1)awareness,
(2) firm belief, and (3) high probability. First, the Act deems a person to have the
requisite knowledge ifhe is "aware": that the third person is engaged in the conduct,
that the circumstance exists, orthat the illegal result is substantially certain to occur.7 9
generally Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 265 (2d ed. 1986).
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (1998), 78dd-3(a) (Supp. 2000).
73. James K. Lehman, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7-APR S. C. Law 38,40 (1996) (citing
S.Rep. No. 114,95th Cong., reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4108).
74.

Id.

75.

Id. (citing United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1379-80 (5th Cir. 1995)).

76.

John W. Duncan, Comment: Modifying the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Searchfor

a Practical Standard, 4 Nw. J. Int'l. L. & Bus. 203, 208 (1982) [hereinafter Duncan]. This vague
standard meant that "the law prohibited payments to third parties by any person knowing or 'having
reason to know' that a bribe was being paid." The implications ofthis standard would directly affect
corporations that have employees, agents, or subsidiaries abroad. Problems with this standard were that
it was vague and judged on circumstances that were viewed in hindsight. This standard was so broad
that it left uncertain the scope ofan individual's liability and how high was the duty to inquire." Bialos
&Husisian, supra note 8, at 37.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2), 78dd-2(hX3) (1998), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(3) (Supp. 2000):
(A) Aperson's states of mind is "knowing"with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or
a result if(1) such person is aware that such person is engaging in such conduct, that such
circumstance exists, or that such result is substantially certain to occur; or
(2) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result
is substantially certain to occur.
(B)
When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an
offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of
the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such
circumstance does not exist.
78. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 40.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2XAXi), 78dd-2(h)(3XA)(i)(1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(3)(A)(i)

2001]

COMMENT

Secondly, knowledge exists when a person has a "firnm belief" that the circumstance
exists or is substantially certain to occur.w Third, a the knowledge standard is
satisfied when the person is aware of a "high probability" of the existence of the
circumstance. 8'
Despite the deletion of the "reason to know standard," the 1988 Amendment of

the Act remains broad. Indeed, the Amendment may have done little to clarify the
knowledge requirement.' In trying to construe what exactly is meant by "high
probability," some commentators suggest that even though the legislative history
indicates that the knowledge requirement goesbeyond "recklessness," a person is still
subject to liability ifhe is aware ofthe "high probability" ofthe circumstance but does
not have actual knowledge." Recklessness exists "when a person is 'aware that his
conduct mightcause the result, though it is not substantially certain to happen."'I On
the other hand, the legislative history ofthe 1988 Amendment specified that liability5
applies to "conscious disregard," 'willful blindness," or "deliberate ignorance."s
Congress stated that "conscious disregard" would include situations where "'any
reasonable person would have realized' the existence of the circumstances or result
and the defendant... consciously [chose] not to ask about what he 'had reason to
believe he would discover."'" This standard was included to eliminate the "head-in8
the-sand" problem, which entails a "conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth."
From the above descriptions, the line between these two classifications of
conduct, recklessness (which is not culpable behavior) and "conscious
disregard/willful blindness" (which is prohibited behavior) is extremely unclear. The
difference seems to be that one implies a duty to investigate and the other does not.
The problem lies in determining how much awareness is required to trigger that duty
and if a quantifiable standard can realistically be determined.
The lack ofa standard specifying what should alert a person to his duty to inquire
or alert him to the "high probability" of a violation isproblematic."' The vagueness
contained in such a broad knowledge requirement still raises questions ofwhen a duty
to investigate exists and, ifso, how far one must go to satisfy that duty. The absence of
a specific standard allows the imposition of criminal liability for the acts of others that
may be imputed without actual knowledge, intent,or participation.
When a corporation has foreign affiliates, such as subsidiaries, venture partners, or
(Supp. 2000).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I(fX2XAXii),78dd-2(hX3XA)(ii)(1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(3)(AXii)
(Supp.2000).
81. 15U.S.C. § §78dd-l(f)(2XB), 78dd-2(hX3)(B) (1998); 15U.S.C.§ 78dd-3(0(3)(B)(Supp.

2000).
82. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 41-42.
83. Id. at 40.
84. Walter R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 239 (2d ed. 1986) (cited in Bialos
& Husisian, supra note 8, at 41).
85. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 41.
86. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. H2115 at 921 (1988) (cited in Bialos &
Husisian, supra note 8, at 41).
87. H.R. Conf. Rep.No. 100-576,at 920(1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949,1952-53.
88. Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 41-42.
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employees, the company may be held liable for the affiliate's illegal conduct.
Possibilities for liability arise if the company knowingly participates, authorizes the
activity, or if the affiliate can be considered the company's agent. 9 Authorization
occurs when the company has knowledge and approves the conduct, either explicitly
or implicitly.' Furthermore, if the foreign affiliate could be considered to be the
company's agent the company may be vicariously liable even without knowledge of
the conduct 9' Liability may result ifthe company exercises enough control over the
affiliate so as to be considered the action ofone unit'
Additionally, if a company learns that a controlled affiliate has made an illegal
payment, the company has the same responsibility it would have in the situation were
such activity performed by its own employee.93 In one case, a court ruled that if a
corporation learns of an unauthorized act by someone undertaken on the company's
behalfand does notrepudiate itwithin areasonable time, the corporation becomes liable
for the act.' However, ifthe company only owns a minority interest in the affiliate, the
responsibility ofthe company is more difficult to determine. One commentator suggests
that a corporation should, at a minimum, refuse capital contributions that may be related
to the activity and should make a formal protest demanding action to prevent further
violations."' However, it is unclear whether mere protest will shield a company from
liability.' Furthermore, the SEC and the Department of Justice suggest that ifthe board
of directors refuses to act effectively, the corporation should sell its interest (even at a
loss) to avoid liability through implicit authorization.'
2. Exceptions andDefenses
The anti-bribery provisions of the Act include an exception to the prohibition of
payments to foreign officials for routine governmental action." This exception allows
for payments to government officials to facilitate or to expedite an action of the official
that is considered routine.' The Act defines this activity as "only an action which is
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official" in an enumerated set of
circumstances.Iro Sometimes referred to as "grease payments," these payments are
89.
90.

Black & Witten, supra note 1, at 3-5.
Id. at 3-6 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, at 8.)

91.

Id.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 3-7.
Id. at3-10.
In Re R. Martin-Trigona, 760 F.2d 1334, 1341 (2d Cir. 1985).
Black & Witten, supranote 1,at3-11.

96.

Id.

97.
98.

Id. (citing I FCPA Rep. 101.018 (1995)).
15 U.S.C. § § 78dd-l(b), § 78dd-2(b), § 78dd-3(b) (Supp. V. 1999):

Exception for routine governmental action.
Subsections (a) and (i)shall notapply to any facilitating orexpediting payment to a foreign
official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the
performance ofa routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party
official.
99. Id.

100.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(fX3); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(hX4), 78dd-3(f)(4) (Supp. V. 1999):
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allowed to induce non-discretionary acts when the official has an obligation to perform
this task anyway.' 0' The routine governmental action exception was added by Congress
in recognition of the common practice in many foreign countries of government
employees supplementing their income by receiving payments fromforeign companies.
Congress2 recognized that if forbidden under the Act, American businesses would
suffer.

The routine governmental actions exception is problematic for several reasons.
First,the dividing line between what may or may notbe discretionary on the part ofthe
official can be difficult to determine. Some commentators argue that, "even if a
payment is made to an official with discretionary authority in order to 'expedite' a
decision he is obliged to make, the application ofthe exemption is difficult After the
fact, it may be difficult to prove that the payment was made purely to facilitate atimely
decision rather than to influence the substantive decision itself."'

3

One corporation was

found to have violated the Act by giving money to an official to secure the payment of
a debt that the country already owed to the corporation.'" The court found this conduct
to be an unlawful
attempt to get an official to use his influence to obtain or to retain
05
business.
The dividing line between discretionary activity and non-discretionary activity is
theoretical and an activity's characteristics often seem to overlap in many practical
circumstances. For example, at a FCPA conference, an official with the Justice
Department was asked about the likelihood of prosecution in a situation where the
foreign official offered to expedite the processing of VAT refunds, for a percentage of
each refund."° Although the company would be legally entitled to the refunds, the
official said thatthis payment would likely not be viewed as a facilitating payment. The
Justice Department official reasoned that the foreign official is exercising some
discretion in deciding which application to process first and the decision involves
retention of business. This hypothetical illustrates the difficulties in defining what
conduct is prohibited and under which circumstances payments may fall under the
(A) The term "routine governmental action" means only an action which is ordinarily and
commonly performed by a foreign official in(I) obtainingpermits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify aperson to do
business in a foreign country;
(2) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work orders;
(3) providingpoliceprotection,mail pick-upanddelivery,orscheduling inspections
associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods

across country;
(4)

providing phone service, power and water supply, loading and unloading cargo,
or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or

(5) actions of a similar nature.
101.
102.

Bialos & Husisian, supra note 8, at 44.
Id. at 42-43.

103.

Id. at 44 n.67.

104. Id.at 34 n.28.
105. Id.
106. Arthur F. Mathews, DefendingSECandDOJFCPAInvestigationsandConductingRelated
Corporate InternalInvestigations:The Triton Energy/IndonesiaSEC ConsentDecree Settlements, 18
Nw. J.Int'l L. & Bus. 303, 315 (1998).
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exception.
The ambiguities of the FCPA are "exacerbated by the attempt of the law to deal
with questions such as what ought to be a permissible (facilitating) payment and what
1°
not (bnbery), which in the end reduce to slippery ethicaljudgments."' As illustrated
by the previous examples, whether prohibited activity meets the statutory requirements

for this exception depends on the characterization of the relevant activity. Is the
intended official's action an activity that he must perform anyway or is the activity
motivated by the official's discretion? Most governmental activity seems to fall under
both categories. To demonstrate, suppose a company wants to obtain a permit to
conduct activity in a foreign country. The usual delay for such authorization is six
months. However, an official iswilling to move the corporation to the top ofthe list for
a modest payment. This action seems to be something that the official would normally
be required to do eventually, but he is also exercising his discretion as to when he will
perform the activity. What if the official had to decide if the company met all the
qualifications required to obtain such apermit? Further, what ifthe waiting period was
purposefully imposed, serving as a mechanism to limit the number of permits in
circulation? Seemingly, changing the surrounding circumstances shows that the
characterization ofthe concerned activity isalmost impossible todifferentiate under the
current definition.
In addition to the routine government actions exception, the FCPA provides two
affirmative defenses to liability for otherwise illegalpayments. The first defense permits
a payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value to a foreign official, if such a
payment islegal under the written laws ofthat country."° Congress created this defense
in the 1988 Amendment to address concerns that foreign relations would suffer ifthe
United States tried to prosecute foractivities that took place in aforeign country, but are
not considered criminal by that country." ° However, due to cultural differences, a
practice proibited under the Act may be permitted in another country.I" Further, the
accepted practice is likely to be permitted by omitting the activity from written law."'
Since most practices are unlikely to be authorized by written law, few practices are
likely to qualify under the exception."
As an affirmative defense the defendant has the burden of proving the defense's
applicability." 3 Thus, how does a person prove that his activity was legal under the
written laws of the host country? The Department of Justice recommends that a U.S.
107. Greanias & Windsor, supranote 1, at 96.
108. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(cXI), 78dd-2(cX) (1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(cXl) (Supp. V. 1999):
It shall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a) of this section that(1) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was lawful
under the written laws and regulations ofthe foreign official's, political party's, party
official's, or candidate's country;
109. Donald R. Cruver, Complying With the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 21 (1999).
110. Steven R. Salbu, The ForeignCorruptPracticesAct as a Threat To GlobalHarmony,20
Mich. J. Int'l L. 419, 425 (1999) [hereinafter Salbu I1].
S111. Bialos & Husisian, supranote 8, at 45 (noting that in transitional economies, it may be
dangerous to rely on changing and uncertain laws).
112. Salbu I1, supranote 110, at 425.
113. Bialos & Husisian, supranote 8, at 45.
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firm receive advice of counsel or receive guidance on these issues through the
Department review procedure."' In fact, the opinion of local counsel has been noted
by the Department of Justice as a factor in its decision whether or not to take action
under its review procedure. '"
The second affirmative defense, added by the 1988 Amendments, allows a
company to make reasonable and bona fide expenditures directly related to the
promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products/services or the execution or
performance of a contract" 16 This defense is not a true affirmative defense in that it is
not available if the conduct is proibited under the anti-bribery provisions and only

clarifies that bona fide expenditures lacking a corrupt purpose are permissible. '" The
difficulty with this defense is that it does not define what constitutes a reasonable or
bona fide expenditure. The absence of a standard enumerating certain factors thatmay
be considered indetermining whether the expenditures are reasonable orbona fidegives
remarkable discretion to the Justice Department to define activity that is criminal on a
case-by-case basis. While the expenditures are still subject to the regular anti-bnbery
provisions, this defense just adds to the confusion of an already ambiguous standard
under the anti-bnbey provisions.
The area that should be of concern to companies is when the activity in question
involves paying the expenses of any foreign official that has discretion to make
decisions for their government."$ The Department of Justice has often approved
expenses as reasonable, when the payments are disclosed to the foreign government,
andpayments are accurately documented in the company's records." 9 In several of the
Department's procedure releases, it has described activities that may fall within the
defense.' In a February 1992 procedure release, the Justice Department advised that
the defense would apply where a party spent money to provide training, travel, and
subsistence expenses for local personnel and lawful under local law, in order to increase
the ability of the local officials to perform oversight functions.' In July of 1983, the
114. Department of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions 7(Feb. 1992)
reprinted inBlack &Witten, supranote 1,at §2. 10[1 ]. The 1988 Amendments authorize the Attorney
General to issue "advisory opinions inresponse to specific inquiries by businesses whereby DOJ issues
an opinion indicating whether it would take any enforcement action." Lynne Baum, Note, Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 35 Am. Crim. L.Rev. 823, 834 (1998) (hereinafter Baum].
115. Black& Witten, supra note 1,at2-11-2-12.
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(cX2), § 78dd-2(cX2) (1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(cX2) (Supp. 2000):
Itshall be an affirmative defense to actions under subsection (a)of this section that(2) the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that was made, was a
reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such astravel and lodging expenses, incurred
by oron behalfof aforeign official, party, party official, or candidate and was directly
related to(a) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation ofproducts or services; or
(b) the execution or performance ofacontract with aforeign government or agency
thereof.
117. Bialos &Husisian, supra note 8,at 46.
118. Id. at 47.
119. Id.
120. Baum, supranote 114, at 832.
121. FCPA Procedure Release No. 92-1 (Feb. 1992), 3FCPA Rptr. 725 (Aug. 1997) (cited in
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Department allowed the defense to apply in an opinion release, where "a party invited
a general manager of a state-owned entity and his wife to extend their pre-planned

vacation by ten days in order to take them on a 'promotional tour' of the party's
domestic facilities, where the party paid for airfare, lodging, travel, meals, and
transportation."' ' This defense, as an exception, is highly discretionary. For example,
what is reasonable? How is corrupt intent proven inthis situation? An expenditure that
does not demand quidproquo,but is made for the purpose of later obtaining business
from the government, can easily be disguised as an expense paid vacation to evaluate
a merchant's products. Within this context determining the nature of an individual's
intentions in order to ascertain whether the individual's conduct constitutes criminal
activity may be problematic.
B. Absence ofa StandardofConduct
Several practitioners have published guides advising companies on how to avoid
prosecution under the FCPA. However, most (if not all) disclose to the reader the
difficulties in prescribing a recommended course of action due to the ambiguous nature
of the Act.'2 In addition to the ambiguous terminology, the lack of standards or
guidelines by which to determine whether conduct is prohibited or not creates further
uncertainty. ' The need for guidance increases in transitional countries where political
5
confusion creates additional concerns for businesses.' The Amendments of 1988
recognized the need for such a standard of conduct. The Amendments mandate that the
Attorney General consult with public agencies and solicit public opinion to determine
the value of guidelines in describing conduct in the Act and in providing general
precautionary procedures that may be used to help conformity with enforcement
policies. '2 However, the Attorney General determined that the publication ofguidelines
2
Some suggest that the lack of guidelines may be due to a fear by
were unnecessary.'
the Department of Justice that such guidelines will be used to aid circumvention of the

Baum, supra note 114, at 832 n.72).
122. Baum, supra note 114, at 832 n.72 (referring to FCPA Procedure Release No. 83-2 (July 26,
1983), 3 FCPA Rptr. 719 (Aug. 1997)).
123. See, e.g., "The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is setup in such a fashion that it compels a costbenefit assessment of these penalties by management without clear scienter or materiality standards.
.Neither lawyers nor accountants can supply final advice on this matter." Greanias & Windsor, supra
note 1, at 100. "Thus, the statute's broad and uncertain scope creates significant liability risks and
difficult compliance choices for U.S. companies doing business abroad, especially those with
multinational operations." Bialos & Husisian, supranote8, at 26. "In-house and outside counsel for
U.S. corporations doingbusiness abroad therefore mustnavigate throughthe extraterritorial application
ofa U.S. criminal bribery statute with unclear standards,in the context ofcomplex and sensitive foreign
business relationships, and in an environment where illicit payments are acommon business practice

of foreign competitors." Zarin, supranote 1, at 1-5.
124. See generally Longobardi, supra note 68, at 431.
125. See generallyChristopher F. Dugan& Vladimir Lechtman, The FCPA in Russia and Other
Former Communist Countries, 91 Am. J. Int'l L. 378 (1997).
126. Salbu I, supra note 35, at 248.
127. Id.
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Act. 2' The absence of legislative or regulatory guidance contributes to the Act's
ambiguity and difficulties in determining prohibited behavior.
C. MulticulturalConsiderations
An inherent problem in regulating activity that occurs in another country involves
differing cultural attitudes toward acceptable practices. While most "egregious forms"
of influence are universally prohibited, difficulties may occur in gray areas due to
differing legal standards for defining bribery.'29 For example, in Korea, it is a
customary practice to give "ttokkap" or rice-cake expenses, which consists of gifts or
payments, generally duringmajorholidays.13 While Korean lawprohibits giving bribes
to public officials and receiving bribes by public officials, a"social courtesy exception"
exists that encompasses practices like the ttokkap. "I To constitute bribery, the payment
must relate to the official's duties and must be given in consideration for the official's
duties.'
Due to cultural differences, the definition of bribery may vary from one
context to the next. A statutory definition that does not incorporate the possibility ofthis
variation creates greater difficulties for an American business to determine the nature
of its activity.
V. UNNECESSARY COSTS

The primary concern in evaluating the failures ofthe FCPA as a policy instrument
in battling international bribery is the additional costs imposed on American
corporations. Legislation enacted to implement a policy should strive for maximum
efficiency in attaining its goals. If the statutory vehicle creates overly burdensome
regulations without concurrent success in reaching the desired end, the legislation will
be viewed as overly burdensome regardless ofwhatever evil it intends to eliminate. In
the case ofthe FCPA, when American businesses face unnecessary costs in transacting
business abroad, the effectiveness of the Act in combating international corruption
decreases.
Unnecessary costs that American businesses face when attempting to comply with
the FCPA are associated with the ambiguous nature of the Act's provisions. When
businesses engaging in international transactions are uncertain as to how to comply with
regulatory provisions, they may become overly cautious, expending unnecessary
resources or disengaging from certain activities altogether.'
In a 1982 article, one

128. 1d. at 263.
129. Joongi Kim & Jong Bum Kim, CulturalDifferences in the Crusade Against International
Bribery:Rice-Cake Expenses in Korea andthe Foreign CorruptPractices Act, 6 Pac. Rim L. & Pol'y
J. 549, 557 (1997) [hereinafter Kim & Kim].
130. Id. at561.
131. Id.at562-66.
132. Id. at 563.
133. "The FCPA's accounting provisions provide inadequate guidance as to what is required, and
companies, therefore, often employ much greater controls than would otherwise be used." Duncan,
supra note 76, at 224.
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commentator argues that uncertainties in the accounting provisions may have resulted
in increased costs for accounting and internal audit controls. 34 While these increased

costs may be considered the price those corporations had to pay in order to comply with
the Act's regulations, they may also indicate, as the commentator suggests,
excessive expenditures due to inadequate guidelines and the perceived need for

protection from uncertainties. 3 However, other commentators argue that most
corporations incurred insignificant compliance costs. However, difficulties in
measuring actual harm has resulted in a lack of empirical evidence, leaving
support for and against economic harm arguments to be gauged by.anecdotal
evidence.
As a direct result of uncertainties in determining what activities may

constitute a violation of the FCPA, some have noted a tendency to overly
cautious behavior by American companies. One manifestation of this overly
cautious behavior occurs when a corporation is unable to determine whether or
not a transaction violates the Act and turns down a legitimate business
opportunity as a result. 13 6 The inability to determine with certainty whether an
activity is not prohibited under the Act's provisions creates anxiety among
businessmen leading them to "err on the side of caution," causing a loss of
business.' In addition, some businesses may avoid doing business altogether
in certain areas where corruption is prevalent, rather than face difficulties
associated with the Act. 38 However, many of these notoriously corrupt countries
are some of the "most dynamic markets," which provide many business
39
Small businesses may also avoid markets
opportunities for American firms.
perceived as corrupt, because many do not have the resources to staff in-house
counsel or public relations specialists to help them deal with the ethical
dilemmas.'1
On the other hand, some commentators argue that the FCPA has served its
purpose, causing American businesses to avoid questionable business deals, and
that the advantages of establishing proper business practices outweighs the costs
of lost business.' 4' While the avoidance of questionable transactions may indeed
134. Id. at 205.
135. Id.
136. Longobardi, supranote 68, at 447.
137. Hall, supra note 54, at 304.
138. Id.
139. Id. Christopher Hall utilizes Indonesia as an example:
Indonesia is a market, however, that United States firms simply cannot ignore. With a
population ofnearly one hundred-ninetymillion people, Indonesia is a tremendous market
for the United States purveyors ofadvanced phone and power grid systems, among a myriad
ofother products. With such vast infrastructure needs, developing countries like Indonesia
provide United States firms with the opportunity for enormous sales. They are also markets
in which bribery is tolerated and often expected.
Id. at 304-05.
140. Michael A. Mayo, EthicalProblemsEncounteredby U.S. Small Businessesin International
Marketing, J. Small Bus. Mgmt., Apr. 1991, at 51.
141. Hall, supranote 54, at 302-03.
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indicate a reduction in corrupt activity by American business, the more important
issue concerns whether such precautionary measures cause undue losses. When
an ambiguous regulation deters activity broadly, decreasing both good and bad
conduct, the ambiguity imposes costs in addition to what may be required to
extinguish the unfavorable conduct. Such additional costs are unnecessary to
achieve the desired result because the uncertainty needlessly deters acceptable

activity.
The policy goals of the FCPA are weakened by such vague standards.
Consequences that occur when firms avoid doing business abroad or wrongly believe
that activity conforms to the law are detrimental to both American business and the
objectives ofthe FCPA." 2 To be a more effective policy instrument, the benefits of
the prohibitions should outweigh the costs ofcompliance. When the burdens of the
policy seem to outweigh any benefit that may be gained, the legitimacy of the policy
instrument is questioned.
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A. StandardofConduct
The vagueness of the FCPA is not only due to the ambiguous nature of the Act's
provisions, but also result from a lack ofguidance to companies attempting to comply
with the law. Ambiguous statutory construction in defining prohibited conduct
necessitates that the Department of Justice provide some other type of direction. 43
This guidance may be provided by the Justice Department in creating "[t]rue
guidelines containing acceptable model transactions.'" With models to guide the
formulation of legal transactions, the preservation of a modified version of the
advisory opinion procedures could assist in the determination of the validity of
145
borderline transactions.
The establishment of a universal standard might also provide a level of
assuredness in multinational transactions. A universal standard would allow
individuals and companies of any nation, engaging in international business, to
fashion its activities according to a uniform set of principles in any locality. The
creation ofa universal standard would create more efficient international transactions,
by providing greater certainty to companies." Aninternational consensus would also
facilitate a global effort to eliminate bribery. 47 Cooperation within the international
community and the establishment of uniform regulations would "level the playing
field" for American companies to effectively compete against foreign firms.
142. Pines, supra note 46, at 196.
143. Longobardi, supra note 68, at 473-74.
144. Id. at 494 (suggestingan approach like the Antitrust Merger Guidelines;"The DOJ could also
officially sanction business structures that it has found valid, or it could present hypothetical models
that it believes to be valid. It could issue a special release of approved transactions and encourage other
companies to imitate these transactions as closely as possible.").
145. Longobardi, supra note 68, at 474.
146. Kim & Kim, supra note 129, at 560.
147. Id.
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B. MulticulturalConsiderations
Attempts to devise a multilateral agreement implementing a uniform standard of

prohibited conduct have been unsuccessful in formulating such a standard.'"
Difficulties in obtaining universal support for a multilateral agreement prohbiting
bribery are due to the inability to achieve an international consensus as to a definition
ofprohibited behavior. Reluctance to endorse a universal standard derives from cultural
variations in the defining what constitutes bribery. 49 Most recognize the harmful
consequences of corruption and agree that improper influence ofgovernment officials
should be eliminated.'" Thus, difficulties in achieving an international consensus arise
from an inability to produce an exclusive definition of bribery to be applied
universally.' 5' However, to obtain a universal consensus, cultural differences must be
taken into consideration. Incorporating cultural differences into an "international
framework" would further international efforts.'
Many of the problems encountered by American companies conducting business
abroad arise from the Act's failure to incorporate varying cultural practices. In
amending the FCPA to include an affirmative defense for payments considered legal in
the written laws of the foreign country where the activity occurs, the U.S. recognized
multicultural concerns, but did not provide a realistic remedy. For an exception ofthis
type to function properly, it must be expanded to include the practices that are lawful
in the foreign country, but not codified. However, opening the exception up to any
practice not expressly prohibited would extend too broadly, allowing any activity not
explicitly prohibited.
On the other hand, the civilian concept of customary law might provide the
flexibility needed to reflect cultural diversity, while still limiting the expansion of the
existing defense. In most civil law jurisdictions, custom isa binding source of law.'"
A practice becomes customary law when it isrepeated over a period oftime and when
it is widely considered to be legally binding.5 ' To rise to the level of custom, the

148. "One central problem ishow to construct aforceful multilateral consensus. While agreeing
that egregiousforms of influence buying should be prohibited, for instance, many are skeptical that an
effective universal proclamation againstbribery can be constructed,particularly because many countries
have different legal standards governing what constitutes bribery." Id. at 557.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 552.
151. "Indeed, the continuing debate and disagreement among members of the OECD Working
Group concerningpayments to foreign political parties and candidates reveal that despite the growing
consensus on foreign bribery, there remain sharp cultural and political differences as to what constitutes
international corruption." Brown 1,supra note 33, at 520.
152. Kim & Kim, supra note 129, at 557.
153. Id. at 579.
154. "[C]ustomary law arises from 'practice repeated for a long period of time and generally
accepted as having acquired the force of law.' This notion of customary law was first formulated in
Roman law during the period ofthe Republic, and it is accepted in most civil lawjurisdictions." A. N.
Yiannopoulos, Civil Law System, Louisiana and Comparative Law 121 (2d ed. 1999).
155. Id. at 121:
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practice must generally be considered in the community to be required by or consistent
with the law.'- 6 Custom is not legislative, but evolves as the result ofcommon behavior
within a community and constitutes a social expectation." 7 Customary law reflects a
body of accepted rules in a community because such practices are repeated over an
extended period of time and become a guide for how to act in certain situations. 5 A
custom may exist in a country when the practice ofgiving a certain type of payment or
gratuity becomes tradition and the country's citizens widely consider the practice to be
lawful. Therefore, while not qualifying as an action that would be authorized under the
"written" laws of that country, the action may still be permitted by law.
C Due DiligenceDefense
A common approach to preventing violations of the FCPA is the implementation
ofcompliance programs.5 9 Corporate compliance programs (sometimes referred to as
corporate codes of conduct) provide a method of internal policing and a system of
reporting misconduct, which serves as a deterent to misconduct.160 Generally, an
adequate compliance program should: (1) contain standards of conduct that are
effectively communicated to employees; (2) create compliance responsibility within
supervisory personnel; (3) establish reporting mechanisms; (4) maintain internal
The definition of customary law in Article 3 of the Louisiana Civil Code indicates that
customs consist of two elements: a long series of actions constantly repeated (longa
consuetudo); and a juridical sentiment that the practice is binding (opiniojuris). This
definition makes it clear that there is a substantial difference between usage and custom.
Usage is a practice lacking the element of juridical sentiment. However long repeated,
usage is not binding.
156. "For there to be a custom, it is necessary that the subjects of the law, when they act in a
certain manner, have the conviction ofconforming themselves tothe law." Gerard Comu, Droit Civil:
Introduction-Les Personnes-Les Biens 39 (4th ed. 1990) (J.Randall Trahan trans. 1999).
157. "A custom is a social happening. It is collective human behavior. It is the common behavior
of the members of the community who, when prompted to act, usually take the same type ofaction in
particular situations." J.Cueto-Rua, Judicial Methods of Interpretation ofthe Law 80-81, 86-89 (cited
in Symeon C. Symeonides, An Introduction to the Louisiana Civil Law System 255-56 (6th ed. 1991 )).
158. "In this respect, regularity ofsocial behavior andemergence of expectations based on such
regularity provide a guide for the judicial determination of what oughtto be protected as 'public order'
or 'good morals."' Symeonides, supra note 157, at 257. "It refers to standards of socialbehavior, to
patterns ofsocial conduct, to accepted social expectations about what conduct is due by one person to
another. Id. at 258.
159.

See generallyJeffrey L. Snyder, International Operations:Managing the Risks,N.Y.L.J.,

May 20, 1996, at S4 [hereinafter Snyder]; Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufrnanis, Minimizing
Corporate Civiland CriminalLiability:A Second Look at Corporate Codes ofConduct, 783eo. L.J.

1559 (1990) [hereinafter Pitt& Groskaufmanis];Alan Cohen, ConductingDueDiligence 2000,Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct, 1176 P.L.I. Corp. 475 (2000); butsee Mary Jane Sheffet, The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Did TheyChange Corporate

Behavior?, 14 J. Pub. Pol'y & Mktg. 290, 295 (1995) (asserting the results of a survey indicate that
although some corporations created or modified their codes of conduct after the passage of the FCPA,
the changes they did make were minor).
160. Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate CompliancePrograms as a Defense to Criminal
Liability: Can a CorporationSave Its Soul?, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 605,645 (1995) [hereinafter Walsh &
Pyrich].
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investigation procedures; (5)contain a system ofpunishment; and (6) require a system
ofaudit procedures.16' In addition, while compliance programs cannot ensure complete
compliance, compliance programs also assist in managing mistakes' 62
Consider for example the Federal Sentencing Guidelines which provide for the
mitigation of penalties if the corporation displays due diligence by maintaining an
effective compliance program.13 The Sentencing Guidelines serve as a motivation to
create and maintain programs topromote compliance with the law and ethical decisionmaking. 6' The guidelines also reward companies for taking responsibility for
6 5 Similarly,
employees and implementing programs to prevent misconduct
implementing a defense of due diligence might motivate companies to detect and
prevent prohibited conduct through compliance programs. The Model Penal Code
provides a due diligence defense to liability ifthe corporation shows it took adequate
precautions to prevent the misconduct'6 The preventive activity can be accomplished
through a corporate compliance program. The Legislature considered incorporating a
due diligence defense in the 1988 Amendments. 16 7 The defense would have shielded
companies from liability for the misconduct ofitsemployees ifthe company could show
it had established procedures that were reasonably expected to prevent and detect
violations and the violating employee's supervisor used due diligence to prevent the
violation. 6 Although the due diligence amendment was ultimately rejected, a
company's due diligence may still constitute an "implicit defense," evidencing the

161.

Id. at 646-49. An effective compliance program consists of these seven elements:

written compliance standards and procedures;
senior level personnel assigned overall responsibility for compliance;
use due care not to delegate authority to individuals whose company knew or should
have known had propensity for illegal activities;
(4) communicate standards through training programs or disseminating written materials;
(5) the company should implement procedures to achieve compliance, such as a
monitoring and auditing system to deter violations, and a process for employers to
report violations by others without fear of retribution;
(6) appropriate disciplinary procedures for a violation; and
(7) after a violation has been detected, taking appropriate steps to respond, and to prevent
similar violations in the future, including modifications to its Compliance program.
United States Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines Manual § 8A1.2 cmt. 3(k) (1997) (cited in J. Lee
Johnson, Comment, A Global Economy and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Some Facts Worth
Knowing, 63 Mo. L. Rev. 979,995 (1998)).
162. Snyder, supra note 159, at 54.
163. See Debbie T. LeClair et al., Federal Sentencing Guidelines For Organizations: Legal
Ethical, and Public Policy Issues For International Marketing, 16 J. Pub. Pol'y & Mktg. 26 (1997)
[hereinafter LeClair]. For the seven requirements for an effective compliance program,see text
accompanying supra note 161.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Model Penal Code § 2.07(5) (1985) (i[Ilt shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over
the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission.").
167. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-576, at 922, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1955.
168. Mathews, supra note 106, at 339-40.
(i)
(2)
(3)
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absence of the requisite knowledge or of willful blindness by management"9 Further,
conducting a due diligence investigation when retaining a foreign sales agent can

demonstrate
the lack ofany circumstance that would indicate aprobability of
70
conduct.
A due diligence defense might also provide a level of certainty for companies by
limiting liability in exchange for good faith efforts to prevent misconduct. One

commentator suggests that due diligence should be an affirmative defense to liability,
whereby a corporation must show by a preponderance of the evidence it has
implemented an effectively functioning program relating to the field in which the
violation occurred.'7 ' The availability of this defense would encourage the creation of

compliance programs, which promote the ultimate policy goal of the Act by deterring
and detecting bribery. The defense may also encourage a more efficient enforcement
through corporate self-regulation." Arguably, corporations are in a better position to
supervise employees, detect misconduct, and prevent violations.'
The defense,
however, serves as a much greater incentive for self-regulation thanmere mitigation of
sentencing. Without the defense, the significant costs associated with implementing
a compliance program must be weighed against the possibility of consideration in the
assessment ofpenalties, but has little or no effect on liability."'
The inclusion of a due diligence defense may allow a corporation to set up
adequate preventive measures and engage in interational transactions without fear of
unlimited liability. While the creation and maintenance ofa compliance program may
involve significant costs, the expenses that a company may incur if convicted, such as
fines, legal fees, and damage to the corporation's reputation would outweigh the cost
of a compliance program.'6 The reliability ofa due diligence defense would allow a
169. John E. Import A Program For Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
Foreign Law Restrictions on the Use of Sales Agents, 24 Int'l Law 1009, 1023 (1990) [hereinafter
Imperil; H. Lowell Brown, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Redux: The Anti-Bribery Provisions of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 Int'l Tax & Bus. Law 260,283 (1994) [hereinafter Brown 11];
Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 160, at 689.
170. Impert, supra note 169, at 1014, 1018 (suggesting the adoption ofa procedure for retaining
foreign agents and the awareness or "red flags" that could indicate the possibility ofmisconduct, such
as excessive commission, family or business ties with government officials, or request that the
commission be paid in a third country).
171. Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 160, at 684-85.
172. Id. at 678. The International Chamber of Commerce's Commission on Unethical Practices
issued a report in 1977which"stressed self-regulation as the most effective way to eliminate corruption
and set forth proposed 'Rules of Conductto Combat Extortion and Bribery'... The guideline section
of the rules encouraged the adoption ofcorporate codes of conduct and the establishment ofrigorous
accounting controls." Brown I, supra note 34, at 479.
173. Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 160, at 678. "[S]elf-regulation is preferable to government
regulation, provided that self-regulation is subject to appropriate oversight and is pursued diligently."
Pitt &Groskaufmanis, supra note 159, at 1561.
174. "The law currently provides insufficient incentives to engage in such regulation. While a
compliance program may mitigate sentencing or affect the decision to prosecute, it does not obligate
prosecutors or judges to treat corporations more leniently. Thus, the current scheme provides no
guaranteed reward for good corporate citizenship." Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 160, at 678.
175. Id. at 679; Pitt & Groskaufnanis, supra note 159, at 1634.
176. Walsh & Pyrich,supra note 160, at 680-81 (arguing a compliance program will reduce costs
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company to implement a compliance program rather than avoiding certain business
transactions altogether. In addition, such a defense would promote the elimination of
bribery through more efficient regulation, while providing greater certainty for
corporations seeking to comply with the Act's provisions.
VII. CONCLUSION

Ambiguities in the provisions ofthe FCPA detract from the Act's effectiveness as
a policy tool in combating bribery of foreign officials. The Act's vague statutory
construction imposes unnecessary costs on American businesses by creating uncertainty
in multinational business transactions. The multiple amendments suggest that the
government not only recognizes the impracticability of complying with such vague
provisions, but also has changed its view as to what the statute should accomplish.
When the FCPA was enacted, the country's political climate that called for the absolute
elimination of bribery of government officials, foreign or domestic. However,
subsequent amendments show a shift in policy, which now promotes the interests of
American businesses competing abroad. In balancing the dual policy concerns (the
elimination of bribery and protecting American businesses), costs must not outweigh
the benefits. To reduce costs associated with the policy objectives, ambiguities should
be clarified. Clarifying the ambiguities within the statute would turn the FCPA into a
more effective tool in fighting bribery and could eliminate the unnecessary costs
associated with compliance.
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by detecting potential wrongdoing to facilitate prevention, remedying harm before it becomes
irreparable, or mitigating any harm that may result). "In the marketplace, public confidence is a
precious commodity, and corporate codes can play a vital role in instilling and maintaining this
confidence both before and after a dreaded employee defalcation." Pitt &Grokaufmanis, supra note
159, at 1636.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Catherine Rogers for her guidance throughout this
endeavor. She has been a continuous source of advice, patience, encouragement, and reassurance,
which has been invaluable to the author personally as well as academically.

